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Abstract:
Fisheries are increasingly understood as complex adaptive systems; but the cultural,
behavioral, and cognitive factors that explain spatial and temporal dynamics of fishing
effort allocation remain poorly understood. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS)
as a visualization tool, this paper combines catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) and
ethnographic data about the Ecuadorian mangrove cockle fishery to explore patterns in
fishing effort and the social production of fishing space. I argue that individual decisions
about where, when, and how to fish result in spatial and temporal patterns in effort
allocation, ultimately regulating open-access fisheries that typically operate on a firstcome, first-serve basis. These emergent patterns in the fishing effort are explained by
individual-level preferences and adaptations; the development of knowledge and
customary norms through the habitual use of resource space by individuals and groups;
ecological conditions; and access. New adaptive challenges threaten to undermine such
self-organization of open-access systems on larger spatial and temporal scales prompting
a likely re-allocation of the fishing effort in the future.
Keywords: artisanal fisheries, local ecological knowledge, decision-making, complex
adaptive systems, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE),
Ecuador.
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Resumen:
Las pesquerías se entienden cada vez más como sistemas adaptativos complejos; sin
embargo los factores culturales, conductuales y cognitivos, que explican la dinámica
espacial y temporal de la asignación de esfuerzo pesquero, siguen poco conocidos. Este
trabajo, utiliza el Sistema de Información Geográfica (SIG) como herramienta de
visualización, y combina la captura por unidad de esfuerzo (CPUE) y los datos
etnográficos sobre la pesquería de concha prieta en el Ecuador, a fin de explorar la
estructura del esfuerzo pesquero y la producción social del espacio de pesca. Esta
investigación sostiene que las decisiones individuales acerca de dónde, cuándo y cómo
pescar resultan en patrones espaciales y temporales de la distribución del esfuerzo, en
última instancia, que regulan las pesquerías de acceso abierto que normalmente operan en
base a, “quien llega primero, se sirve primero.” Estos patrones emergentes en el esfuerzo
pesquero se explican por las preferencias y adaptaciones a nivel individual, el desarrollo
del conocimiento y las normas consuetudinarias a través del uso habitual del espacio de
recursos por los individuos y los grupos, las condiciones ecológicas, y el acceso. Nuevos
desafíos adaptativos amenazan con socavar esta regulación interna de los sistemas de
acceso libre en las escalas espaciales y temporales más grandes. Esto puede provocar una
probable re-asignación del esfuerzo pesquero en el futuro.
Palabras claves: pesca artesanal, conocimiento local ecológico, toma de decisiones,
sistemas adaptativos complejos, Sistemas de Información Geográfica (SIG), captura por
unidad de esfuerzo (CPUE), Ecuador.
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Introduction
Coastal degradation, the decline of marine resources, and a crisis in fisheries
management has propelled revisions in fisheries science, which currently seeks to
understand human dimensions of environmental change, complexity, and spatialtemporal dynamics of marine resources (St. Martin 2004; Acheson et al. 1998; Finlayson
and McCay 1998; Wilson et al. 2013b; Wilson 2002; Mahon et al. 2008; McGoodwin
1990). Moving beyond the simplistic bioeconometric models of conventional fisheries
management that assume a predictable relationship between fishers and marine resources,
current research incorporates this new focus on spatial and temporal dimensions for
marine spatial planning and ecosystem-based management (Kaplan et al. 2010; St.
Martin 2001; St. Martin et al. 2007).1 A large part of this paradigm shift encourages
collaborative learning between scientists and resource users (St. Martin et al. 2007), as
well as the incorporation of local knowledge (Aswani and Lauer 2006; García-Quijano
2009; Valdés-Pizzini and García-Quijano 2009; Narchi et al. 2013; Berkes et al. 2000)).
In this more holistic approach to understanding fisheries as complex adaptive
systems, the cognitive and behavioral dimensions of fishing effort allocation remain
poorly understood and a large source of uncertainty for fisheries management (Hilborn
2007; Teh et al. 2012; Fulton et al. 2011; Salas and Gaertner 2004; Salas et al. 2004;
Daw 2008; García-Quijano 2009; Guest 2003; Wilson et al. 2013b; Daw et al. 2012).
Understanding cultural factors influencing fisher decisions about where, why, and when
to fish could offer many insights to fishery scientists about how fishers may respond to
changes in resource distribution caused by climate change or socio-political factors like
the establishment of marine protected areas. As Hilborn (2007: 287) also noted, early
work on fisheries focused narrowly on the “optimal” behavior of fishers (Gordon 1954),
which makes marine resources susceptible to a tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968).
Anthropologists and other researchers have offered alternative explanations for humanenvironment interactions drawing upon cross-cultural comparative studies of social
organization in non-Western fishing societies (for example, see Johannes 1978; Cordell
1974; Smith 1977; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994; McCay and Acheson 1987). Much
previous research on folk management was less concerned with individual decisionmaking and more intent on providing descriptions about how these traditional systems
worked and their potential for self-regulation in the absence of formal mechanisms that
aim to control fishing behavior and effort allocation. Recent studies have appropriately
drawn attention to the vulnerability of folk management systems in the face of modernity,
demographic change, markets, and inappropriate policies (Cinner 2005; Cinner et al.
2007; Acheson and Brewer 2003; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994). Other recent research has
focused on the emergence of regulatory access controls through a deliberate process of
learning, adaptation, and self-organization (Basurto 2005, 2008; Basurto et al. 2012) and
the effects of changing environments on fishing livelihoods and adaptations (Van Holt
2012; Endter-Wada and Keenan 2005).
While studies of folk management systems have deepened understanding about
the relationship between communities and the environment, some researchers have
questioned the assumptions about environmental stewardship since social and biological
data have only been integrated in a handful of case studies (Berkes 2005; Pollnac and
1

Both citations for St. Martin provide a more thorough description and critique of bioeconometric
modeling and maximum sustainable yield often used in conventional fisheries management.
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Johnson 2005). The literature has also generated some debate about whether conservation
outcomes in traditional societies are intentional or epiphenomenal (Pollnac and Johnson
2005; Ruttan 1998; Hames 1987). Other researchers have questioned the origins of
customary laws and whether they emerged out of a long history of co-evolution between
maritime communities and their environments (Dyer and McGoodwin 1994) or if they
represent a relatively recent imposition of Western conservationist values (Zerner 1994).
As such, Pollnac and Johnson (2005) have suggested that a more vigorous investigation
of human-environment interactions is needed to increase the credibility of social science
contributions to fisheries science and management.
Studies in human ecology have examined the ways in which territoriality may
serve as an informal self-regulating mechanism in fisheries (Acheson 1975; Acheson and
Gardner 2004, 2005; Begossi 2006; Begossi 2001; de Castro and Begossi 1996). Like
previous anthropological work on territoriality, these theories are spatial in nature and
give special attention to the role of resource abundance or scarcity in patterns of
exploitation (Cashdan 1992; Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978). In addition to the ways in
which populations of fishers respond to ecological dynamics, these studies have pointed
to the ability of fishers to organize collectively, make decisions within technological or
economic constraints, or practice avoidance through “niche partitioning” or mutual
respect (Nunes et al. 2011; Begossi 2001; Acheson 1987). In other words, territoriality
often emerges out of cooperative or competitive behaviors of individuals or groups
(Acheson and Gardner 2004). Territorial defense has been a key concept in Acheson’s
work on the Maine lobster fishery, in which the differential productivity of fishing
grounds is a result of internal regulation based on fierce rivalry among groups of
lobstermen (Acheson 1987; Acheson and Brewer 2003). Others have argued along
similar lines that territoriality expressed through secrecy or active defense has been a way
of controlling access to marine resources on the high seas (Durrenberger and Palsson
1987). Begossi (2001) has documented less aggressive forms of territoriality based on
mutual respect and reciprocity in the Atlantic Forest in Brazil. Others have observed that
the division of fishing space is based on “niche partitioning” or the application of
different fishing strategies under various technological constraints (Nunes et al. 2011;
Begossi 2001).
Alternatively, harvesters with relatively equal access to fishing space respond to
fluctuating resource abundance through mobility and a series of individual decisions
about where to fish. Patch choice and patch time allocation models used in human
behavioral ecology have been powerful tools for explaining how decisions are shaped by
resource availability, patchiness, and seasonality (Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi
2011; Sosis 2002; Aswani 1998; Thomas 2007). As observed by Sosis (2002), fishers
respond to environmental variability and exhibit preferences for patches with the highest
profitable returns. They move on to the next most profitable patch when the returns fall
below the average. As predicted by optimal foraging theory, fishers alternate fishing
grounds based on their knowledge and experience with patch productivity on a previous
day (Sosis 2002; Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi 2011).
While patch-choice models suggest some degree of environmental determinism,
Sosis’s (2002) findings raise interesting questions concerning the social production of
fishing space. He notes, despite the high explanatory power of the patch choice model,
his data failed to explain why two particular patches of low profitability were exploited.
4
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As also once argued by Cashdan (1983), animal behavioral models often fail to capture
the role of culture. Other researchers have argued that preferred resource spaces are based
more on perceptions of safety, risk, and costs rather than maximizing catch rates (van
Oostenbrugge et al. 2004; Teh et al. 2012). Moreover, while patch-choice models use
individual-level data, the results are often aggregated to explain population trends,
thereby obscuring important individual-level cultural nuances and losing an opportunity
for individuals to explain their preferences in their own words.
In this paper, I use catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) data, Geographic Information
Systems (GIS), and ethnographic analysis to explore cultural explanations for the patterns
in fishing effort allocation in Ecuador’s fishery for mangrove cockles (Anadara
tuberculosa and A. similis), bivalve mollusks gathered by artisanal fishers in coastal
mangrove forests during low tide periods. In the last ten years, the fishery has
experienced harvesting pressures (Mora et al. 2009, 2011). Fishing pressure has been
further exacerbated by decades of mangrove deforestation associated with the
unregulated expansion of shrimp aquaculture and more recent policy changes that have
created new common property rights for local fishing associations, which now restrict
access to areas once universally enjoyed by all cockle collectors as a public good (Beitl
2012b; Martinez-Alier 2001). This paper is concerned with fishing effort allocation in the
remaining open-access areas of the fishery that continue to operate on a first-come, firstserve basis. I use GIS as a tool to visualize the fishing effort over time and space on a
micro-scale and ethnographic data to explore how cockle fishers navigate their
preferences for particular fishing grounds, and how such preferences develop through
daily practice and interaction with the environment. The overall aim is to explain how
fishing space is socially produced, adaptive challenges, and the implications for fishery
sustainability. Responding to the “spatial turn in fisheries science” (St. Martin 2004), this
research addresses a methodological gap in the study of folk systems (Pollnac and
Johnson 2005) and contributes to burgeoning interest in how open-access situations do
not always result in a tragedy of the commons (Moritz et al. 2013).
Study Site
The research reported here was carried out in Isla Costa Rica in the southern
province of El Oro, Ecuador (Figure 1). Additional ethnographic information about the
cockle fishery was gathered over a period of 21 months between 2006 and 2010 in the
provinces of Esmeraldas and El Oro. The study areas have all been significantly affected
by the conversion of coastal mangrove forests for shrimp aquaculture since the 1980s.
The two study areas in Esmeraldas (Muisne and Las Manchas) have lost about 75% of
their original cover, and the Archipelago Jambelí in El Oro has lost over 50%
(CLIRSEN-PMRC 2007). Despite the significant levels of habitat degradation over the
last several decades, mangrove cockles have maintained significant cultural and
economic importance in each of the study areas.
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Figure 1. Map of the study areas. This paper draws on ethnographic research conducted in the provinces of
El Oro and Esmeraldas. Isla Costa Rica is the main study area for the analysis of the fishing effort over
time and space.

While all mangroves in Ecuador are considered government domain, artisanal
fishers have ancestrally enjoyed usufruct rights to harvest resources from them. However,
over the last several decades, shrimp farmers have exercised their political and economic
power to exploit loopholes in laws, poor monitoring, and confusing jurisdictions of the
coastal zone. These factors have resulted in the unregulated expansion of the shrimp
industry over several decades. In the year 2000, the government began granting ten-year
mangrove concessions called custodias to local fishing associations for community-based
stewardship and sustainable use (Bravo 2007). To date, about 38,000 hectares of
mangroves have been allocated to 41 community associations (Rosero Moya and
Santillan Salas 2011).
Isla Costa Rica is located on the outer edge of the Archipelago Jambelí in El Oro
Province, a landscape dominated by shrimp farms and a complex estuarine system
fringed with mangrove stands. Located about 45 minutes in motor-powered boat from the
Port of Hualtaco and another 15 minutes by bus from the city of Huaquillas on the
Peruvian border, Isla Costa Rica’s 300 inhabitants depend primarily on mangrove
6
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resources for their livelihoods. Like other communities in El Oro, men and boys have
traditionally harvested cockles for subsistence and markets (INP 1971), in contrast to
Esmeraldas Province where, until recently, cockle collecting has been predominantly
associated with women and children (Ocampo-Thomason 2006; Mera Orcés 1999). Some
families practice cockle mariculture by storing small shells below the market size in
mangrove enclosures located directly in front of their homes. There are two local fishing
associations. One, whose constituents are primarily cockle collectors and their wives, is
in charge of a custodia.
As one of the first recipients of a custodia, the Asociación Isla Costa Rica has
successfully managed their 519 hectare concession since the year 2000 (Bravo and
Altamirano 2006; Beitl 2011). As such, Isla Costa Rica reflects a mixed property system,
in which all four property arrangements highlighted in the commons literature are present
(see Ostrom et al. 1999): 1) public/ government (all mangrove, beach, and waterways); 2)
private (shrimp farm concessions); 3) common property (custodia of the Association Isla
Costa Rica); and 4) open-access (all gathering grounds outside the custodia shared with
fishers from adjacent communities) (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Mixed “property” arrangements include: 1) Government (mangrove, beach, and waterways); 2)
private (shrimp farm concessions); 3) common property (fishery areas within a community concession
utilized exclusively by residents of Isla Costa Rica; 4) open-access (all fishery areas not delineated by the
boundaries of a concession by which all fishers share usufruct rights).
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Based on local ecological knowledge, experience with the productivity of fishing
grounds, as well as biological knowledge presented in workshops by external
organizations, the association has designated certain cockle beds within their custodia for
periodic closures: Chanchos, Diluvio, Costa Rica, Cemeterio, Jesus Maria, and Manoas.
Other parts of the custodia and open-access areas are harvested daily. The fisherymanaged areas are harvested for ten days after 30-day closure periods, with the exception
of Manoas harvested every Saturday. The managed areas function much like the common
property regimes described by Ostrom (1990) with locally designed rules, monitoring,
sanctioning, and a rotating guard system by members of the association to prevent access
by outsiders (Beitl 2011).2 During the early years, the Asociación Isla Costa Rica actively
defended its custodia against cockle collectors from Puerto Hualtaco most likely
harvesting their own ancestral gathering grounds around the neighboring community of
San Gregorio, which was abandoned in the 1950s due to subsidence. Today, fishers from
Hualtaco and Isla Costa Rica share open-access space. While many cockle collectors
from Hualtaco respect the boundaries of Isla Costa Rica’s custodia, they continue to
occasionally face violent confrontations with the proprietors of other newly established
concessions throughout the archipelago (Beitl 2012b).
Methods
The micro-scale analysis of fishing effort allocation in Isla Costa Rica draws on
CPUE data gathered by the association from January 15 to June 30, 2010 as part of our
agreement for a community monitoring project. 3 Similar to the concept of “return rates”
used in optimal foraging theory for its ability to estimate relative resource abundance
(Aswani 1998), CPUE is a measure of the density of the population size of a target
species used by fishery scientists to assess stocks. According to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, “large CPUEs indicate large populations since many
individuals are caught for every unit of fishing effort” (NOAA n.d.). The National
Fisheries Institute (INP) in Ecuador, a public research institution, defines CPUE as the
average number of shells per unit of effort, where each unit of effort refers to each
fisher’s trip.
To document and explore preferences in fishing space, we began with exploratory
fisher diaries (n=10). From March to April 2009, each participant kept a daily record of
the number of shells and names of the sites, among other information. These preliminary
results were shared and discussed in two separate focus groups to gain understanding
about who decides to go where and why. The exploratory diaries and focus groups also
provided substantial background information that aided in the design of a semi-structured
interview questionnaire (Weller and Romney 1988; Johnson 1998), which was
administered in all four study areas. Using an Etrex Vista Global Positioning System
(GPS) we mapped the location of the gathering grounds during high tide.4 The map was
later verified by the ten fisher diary participants.
2

For a more detailed description of characteristics of common property regimes, see Ostrom (1990).
Per our agreement, these data are now the intellectual property of the Asociación Costa Rica and future
research using this dataset should note the appropriate citation (Asociación de Mariscadores Pescadores
Artesanales y Afines "Costa Rica" 2010).
4
All points were marked at the entrance to small creeks more accessible by motor-powered boat during
high tide.
3
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The idea for the community monitoring project grew out of conversations with
Adolfo Cruz, the president of the association (Beitl and Cruz 2010). One field assistant
collected daily CPUE data from 27 participants over 166 days (excluding Sundays and
holidays), resulting in 2,160 observations from 60 different gathering grounds. The
participants included members of the association, their sons, and two members from the
island’s other fishing association, representing about half of the estimated number of
cockle fishers in the village. Participants provided information about the site of
extraction, CPUE, the number of hours worked, number of shells used for personal
consumption or mariculture, number left in the mangrove, the number sold, and their
alternative activity if they did not go cockle collecting. In addition to CPUE data, the
field assistant documented the total fishing effort each day by counting the number of
fishermen from March to June.
I entered all the CPUE data into an Excel spreadsheet and exported it to SPSS
17.0 for cross-tabulation of fisher by fishing ground to create a pivot table. The table was
joined with GPS points in GIS to create a new layer file capable of depicting the intensity
of individual effort by site over time. To further prepare the data for analysis, I divided
the fishing grounds into four major zones (Figure 2): 1) sites around San Gregorio (Zone
1); 2) sites around Chelén Estuary often referred to as “aquí atrás” or “right here behind”
the community (Zone 2); 3) the area of the custodia harvested on a daily basis called
Sector Corazones (Zone 3); and 4) the fishery-managed areas of the custodia harvested
for ten days after 30-day closure periods. I used analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) to
compare differences in CPUE between the four zones.
The ethnographic analysis draws on semi-structured interviews (n=146),
observations, participant observation, and focus groups (n=7) in all four study areas. In
Isla Costa Rica, field assistants and key informants often helped with participant
recruitment (n=58).5 In Puerto Hualtaco, cockle buyers, field assistants, and occasionally
INP biologists helped randomly select individuals as they disembarked from the boats
returning from fishing trips as the tide was rising (n=33).6 In Muisne, my field assistant
and I randomly recruited informants from our boat in the middle of the estuary at the end
of the low tide period, offering refreshments and to tow people’s canoes into port in
exchange for their participation (n=47). In the village of Las Manchas, my field assistant
and I recruited informants during five separate visits (n=8). The general questionnaire
was divided into four sections including 1) information about the catch, fishing grounds,
and activity of cockle collecting; 2) baseline demographic information; 3) perceptions
about change in mangroves and the cockle fishery; and 4) participation in civil society,
collective action, and other livelihood strategies (see Beitl 2012a). Two questions from
the general questionnaire were particularly relevant for this portion of the research: the
name of each informant’s favorite gathering ground(s) and reasons for their preference(s).
In each of the focus groups (n=7), three to 25 participants helped me further understand
how people choose certain fishing areas. Moreover, I gained much understanding by
participant observation in cockle collecting in all four study areas. The ethnographic data
were used to interpret and contextualize the spatial patterns in the fishing effort revealed
by GIS.

5
6

23 of those 58 interviewees also participated in the community monitoring project.
Out of the 36 recruited in Puerto Hualtaco, only three declined to participate.
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Results
Table 1 registers the names of the 60 gathering grounds divided into four zones in
Isla Costa Rica. The table includes information about average CPUE at each site, total
number of trips (fishing effort), distance from the community, and the number of times
that site was cited in an interview as “preferred” by cockle fishers from Isla Costa Rica
and Hualtaco. The mean catch is 79 shells per unit of effort (n=2,160) with significant
differences between the four zones (ANOVA: F = 35.90; df = 3; p = 0.000; n = 2,146).7
Encenada (Zone 3) is the most popular site with the highest frequency of trips, followed
by three gathering grounds in the managed areas of the custodia, and finally, San
Gregorio (Zone 1). The most frequented site in Zone 2 is Chelén. Interestingly, less
popular sites in Zone 2 along the Chupadores Estuary were cited as preferred spots by
about one-third of the cockle fishers interviewed in Hualtaco (n=33).
Table 1. Names and characteristics of all gathering grounds frequented by residents of Isla Costa
Rica from Jan – Jun 2010.

GATHERING
GROUNDS

Mean CPUE (number of shells
per unit of fishing effort, or
trip)

Total
Number of
Trips

Distance from
Community (km)

Number of times cited
in interviews as
“preferred”

Mean CPUE
Std. Deviation
______________________________________________________________________
Grounds in Zone 1: Areas around San Gregorio
Barquillo

69

41.89

5

2.533

1 (CR), 1(H)

Cabos

63

10.79

7

2.404

1 (CR)

Huevito

71

24.55

77

2.896

2 (CR)

San Gregorio

71

23.67

146

2.407

4 (CR), 1 (H)

Silverio *

118

60.1

2

Total Zone 1

71

24.64

237

Grounds in Zone 2: Areas near the Community and "Aquí Atrás"

7

Buenos Aires

62

7.21

3

3.476

Cambise

77

43.78

18

2.531

Canalete

63

17.31

21

2.4

Canto *

57

19.57

30

Canton *

45

21.21

2

Chelen

58

25.46

71

2.164

Chucha

97

12.37

7

2.558

Chupadores

53

26.3

4

3.949

Cruce Chupador

110

.

1

5.183

Guato

77

27.19

61

2.13

Juanillos *

50

14.14

2

La Zora

60

17.32

3

2.084

Manoas

65

21.56

45

0.964

Mejillon

40

14.14

2

3.292

Mero

87

23.83

7

3.566

1 (CR)

3 (CR)
3 (CR), 13 (H)
1 (CR)
1 (CR)

Note that trips with incomplete information were dropped from the analysis of CPUE by zone.
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Murcielago

80

.

1

1.683

Palo Caido

48

18.11

8

2.532

Pancho *

74

35.27

6

2.614

Pato

63

33.18

31

2.405

Raya

75

.

1

3.705

Tumba Rel

115

49.5

2

2.791

Vial *

100

.

1

0.89

Pampita *

78

.

1

Piedredo *

145

.

1

Sango *

101

20.51

2

Sanja *

75

.

1

Sortija *

28

.

1

Vacon *

82

.

1

Total Zone 2

67

28.59

330

500 Lisas

3.136

1 (CR), 1(H)

1.274

1 (CR)

Grounds in Zone 3: "Sector Corazones"
Arenal

80

21.07

44

5.331

Casas

81

22.87

143

5.864

5 (CR)

Corral

84

24.17

95

5.908

2 (CR)

Cruce de Corazones
Cuchillo

149
100

68.49

5

5.964

6 (CR)

Encenada

79

27.71

451

Pato Corazones *

63

30.55

3

Peligro

75

.

1

Perro

79

32.38

Varadero

225

Cogollo *

.

1

5.196

2 (CR)

5.149

16 (CR)

21

4.689

2 (CR)

.

1

6.916

48

3.54

2

Desague *

75

.

1

Lagarto *

80

.

1

Llanto

150

.

1

Total Zone 3

81

27.6

770

38.19

22

Ballena

6.781

2 (CR)

7.538

1 (CR), 1(H)

Fishery-Managed Areas of the Custodia
Cemeterio

111

2.646

Chanchos

100

34.7

330

1.396

Costa Rica

72

27.19

178

0.1619

Diluvio

74

27.02

270

1.223

Jesus Maria

75

26.71

10

1.981

Total Managed Areas

85

33.64

810

Cruce *

103

16.43

5

El Cruce *

65

25

3

Gabino *

140

.

1

Toldo *

80

.

1

1 (CR)
1 (CR)

Unknown Locations

Marranco *
Total (all sites)

1 (CR)
79

31.15

2160

______________________________________________________________________
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Caption: * Table includes: average catch-per-unit effort (CPUE) and fishing effort (total trips), distance
from community, and the number of times each site was mentioned as a preferred spot during the
interviews in Isla Costa Rica (CR, n=58) and Hualtaco (H, n=33). * denotes the coordinates were not
mapped with a GPS.

Figure 3 depicts aggregations of fishing effort allocation during two phases,
illustrating the movement of fishers in response to rules of their common property
arrangements. Figure 3a depicts the closure periods for managed areas and Figure 3b
illustrates the open periods. The larger circles indicate a higher number of fishing trips.
Figure 3a further suggests that fishing effort is higher in Zone 3, an area also associated
with a higher CPUE (Table 1).
3a.
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3b.

Figure 3. Fishing effort allocation over space during two phases: a) closure periods of the managed area; b)
open periods of the managed area.

Figure 4 graphically illustrates the relationship between fishing effort (number of
trips) and catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE). The figure shows that despite the high number of
fishing trips to Zone 3 and the managed areas, a relatively stable harvest of shells per
person is maintained across all sites. However, the average CPUE is slightly higher in
these two zones compared with Zones 1 and 2 with statistically significant differences
(Table 1). This relationship between effort and CPUE suggests that Zone 3 (like the
managed areas) is more productive and able to withstand a higher fishing effort than the
other two zones. However, like Figure 3, this figure also fails to explain why less
productive areas in Zones 1 and 2 are harvested and by whom.
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Figure 4. Relationship between fishing effort and CPUE in Isla Costa Rica. * Note that only the most
popular sites with three or more trips are presented.

Figure 5 shows the fishing effort allocation by individuals, illustrating that certain
fishers habitually harvest from the same zones, even if they are not the most productive
(Figure 5). Each individual was color-coded in three primary colors according to his
apparent “preference” from the data (or zone associated with his highest frequency of
trips over time). These apparent preferences for certain areas correlated with their stated
preferences in interviews (n=20). The 13 fishers with the highest frequency of trips to
Zone 3 were coded blue; the four who prefer Zone 2 were coded red; and one who
preferred Zone 1 was coded yellow. Individuals who harvest from two or more zones
with relatively equal frequencies were coded their respective secondary colors, orange
(Zones 1 and 2), green (Zones 1 and 3), and purple (Zones 2 and 3). The three people
who harvest managed areas almost exclusively were coded white. To explain these
apparent preferences, the following sections turn to the ethnographic data.
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Figure 5: Individual differentiation in fishing effort allocation over space from Jan – Jun 2010

Since preferences for resource space are not unique to Isla Costa Rica, Table 2
summarizes responses from interviews in all four study areas. Free responses were coded
and quantified in the table. The categories are not mutually exclusive since the questions
were open-ended. Common reasons included: “more shells” (n=41), “bigger shells”
(n=22), or “closer” (n=15). When I left the question more open-ended, some people
responded similarly, but other explanations emerged, such as, “estoy enseñado” or “I am
used to going there” or “allí cojo,” or literally “that’s (the spot) I get.” I also heard “it’s
my area” and “it’s where I always get shells.” A cockle collector from Muisne summed
up what I heard from many others: “todos cogen su rutina” or “everyone makes their own
routine.” Those who did not have specific reasons for frequenting certain gathering
grounds suggested they go wherever the boat takes them alone, with their family, or
group of friends. The 10% (n=146) that did not have favorite spots typically responded
this way—that “all the gathering grounds are the same.” Further discussions during the
focus groups revealed other insights into how these customary norms may have
developed over time. Some people commented on ecological conditions and how they
typically avoid areas where the mud is too soft or too hard. Others expressed their
knowledge about the relationship between shell size and ecological conditions (i.e. small
shells from soft mud and larger shells from harder substrate, or in the préstamos along
shrimp pond walls).
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Table 2. Response categories explaining site preferences from interviews (n=146).
Response
category

Number

Explanation

________________________________________________________________________
More shells

41

More shells. One can harvest them faster and return home quicker.

Bigger
Shells

22

Bigger shells. Some explained the reason for this is because there is
less competition in these areas.

"Enseñado"

19

“That's where I always go" or "that's my area" or "that's where
everyone goes." They have been going there since childhood and it
was where their relatives, friends, or "their ancestors" showed them.

Closer

15

Those who liked to work close to home did not like paying for the trip
(usually $1-2 depending on the distance).

Boat brings
us there

14

"That's where we always go" (Isla Costa Rica) or "wherever they take
me" (Puerto Hualtaco).

Preferred
sites not
viable

13

Preferred gathering grounds were no longer viable or accessible
because of shrimp farms, custodias, too much competition, or
overexploitation.

Ecological
reason

9

Includes explanations like, "larger areas" or "better habitat for cockles"
or they find the substrate easier gather shells quickly.

Company

6

Depends. They go wherever the others go.

No reason

4

Did not know why they preferred the areas they cited.

Safer

1

(Isla Costa Rica) Safer from piracy or other malicious people.

Other

4

"I like to go where few others go" or "few outsiders."

13

“All sites are the same” and they go "everywhere," "different places,"
or "wherever they take me." "We alternate among cockle beds
depending on the tidal period." "You go to your site and search for
cockles. If someone else is already there, you move on."

No
preference

_______________________________________________________________________
Caption: * Note categories are not mutually exclusive.

Discussion
Collecting Cockles in the Mangrove Margins
In a day’s work, many cockle fishers secure their rubber boots and gloves, bundle
their bodies and heads in clothing, and arm themselves with mosquito repellent to protect
against the hot sun or cold rain and wind, aggressive insects, biting snakes, and stinging
fish that burrow in the mud. A net bag called a jicra is used in El Oro to gather the shells
while in Muisne, cockle collectors use anything from traditional gathering baskets to
buckets, plastic bags, half soda bottles, their pockets, or their boots. The faena (work
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period) usually lasts about three hours for most, but many cockle collectors work until
they “completar,” or reach a rounded number of 25, 50, or 100 shells, depending on their
goal for the day, level of skill, and luck. After finding a suitable patch and enduring a
crouched position as they weave through a thicket of low-lying branches, maneuvering
over and around the prop roots, or sinking in thigh-deep mud, the collector will have
gathered anywhere between five to 250 shells that sell for $7-22 per 100 shells,
depending on the province. In El Oro, cockles sell for $12-22/100 depending on quality
(size of shells). In Esmeraldas, shells sell for $7-12/100. Prices increase when demand is
highest during Easter and Christmas holidays when Ecuadorians flock to the beaches and
demand traditional coastal cuisine.
Tides play a key role in decisions about where and when to fish, and for how
long. In Isla Costa Rica, gill-net fishing is usually done during high tides and cockle
collecting during low tides. Some men do both activities while others are dedicated
exclusively to cockle collecting. As one man commented, “our whole way of life here on
the island is dictated by the tides.”8 Spring tides (full moon) and neap tides (new moon)
alternate on a cycle of eight-day periods. The larger swell of spring tides is associated
with a longer lag time between rising and falling tides. This allows collectors to reach
areas normally submerged during neap tides or travel further out into areas with less
harvesting pressure. The lunar cycle and tidal periods also influence decisions about
cockle collecting in Esmeraldas. People in Muisne refer to spring tides as “agua buena,”
or “good water,” and neap tides as “agua mala,” or “bad water” when many cockle
collectors decide to stay home or dedicate their time to other livelihood strategies. Those
who decide to collect cockles during the shorter “agua mala” period usually stay close to
the community.
In addition to the lunar cycle and tidal periods, seasonal cockle collecting and
daily fluctuations in the fishing effort might also reflect conditions of the broader
economic context. The increase in prices during holidays provides incentives for parttime cockle collectors who typically prefer other livelihood strategies. Some researchers
have noted that the cockle fishery may be a last resort when other jobs are not available
(Ocampo-Thomason 2006; Velásquez Runk et al. 2007). Others have asserted a social
stigma is associated with cockle collecting in Ecuador (Kuhl and Sheridan 2009).
However, for many cockle fishers, it is a resource that can be harvested year-round with
reliable returns, thereby ensuring more income security than other small-scale fisheries
that require investments in gear or specialized knowledge. Similar to other studies of
fishermen (McGoodwin 1990; Griffith and Valdés Pizzini 2002), many cockle collectors
in Ecuador prefer the freedom of fishing and collecting cockles over being “peons” in
wage-labor positions. For some, particularly in the smaller communities and among
members of local fishing associations, there is a great sense of pride and job satisfaction.
Division of Space: Territoriality versus Mutual Respect
Throughout much of the Ecuadorian coast, the mangrove cockle fishery is openaccess operating on a first-come, first-serve basis. The social division of space in the
open-access areas around Isla Costa Rica reflects an informal system of mutual respect
among members of the community and outsiders from Hualtaco, similar to other smallscale fisheries in Mexico (McGoodwin 1994) and the Atlantic Forest in Brazil (Begossi
8

All quotations are my translations from Spanish.
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1995; Begossi 2001). For example, despite their proximity to the community, certain
cockle beds in Zone 2 were cited as preferred spots by people in Hualtaco and frequented
less by collectors in Isla Costa Rica (see Table 1). One explanation for this mutual respect
is that many fishers in Hualtaco are distant relatives whose families have migrated to the
port in the last 50 years. This social system of cordial relations among fishers from
different communities is further maintained through membership of many local
associations to larger provincial and national federations of fishing associations. For
example, when the Asociación Isla Costa Rica celebrated their ten-year anniversary
during my residency in November of 2009, they invited several associations from
Hualtaco, friends and relatives from neighboring communities, and employees on local
shrimp farms to join in the festivities consisting of soccer matches by day and dancing,
eating, and drinking into the night.
On the other hand, many cockle collectors from Hualtaco and Isla Costa Rica
reported defensive behavior among fishers in the community of Las Huacas (adjacent to
Isla Costa Rica), similar to territoriality in Maine’s lobster fishery (Acheson 1987, 1975).
Stories abound about violent confrontations with fishers from Las Huacas often described
as “mean” and “criminal-like.” Men from Las Huacas are infamous for beating those who
trespass into their areas; they confiscate their catches and sometimes steal their personal
belongings like jicras, caps, money, wristwatches, or jewelry. Informants in Muisne also
relayed similar accounts of confrontations with people from Las Manchas who have a
reputation of threatening outsiders with machetes, a claim the people from Las Manchas
do not deny. However, territorial behavior may be unique to only certain communities
and not generalizable to the entire Ecuadorian cockle fishery. For the most part, cockle
collectors in Ecuador are non-confrontational and with the exception of the new
custodias, the fishery is characterized as a free-for-all in which fishing space is divided
among individuals who are enseñados to their customary grounds. For example, if a
cockle collector arrives at a site that someone else has gotten first, he might feel agitated,
but there is not much he can do other than simply accept it and think to himself, “me
ganó el puesto” or “he beat me to it” before moving on to a different area.
Becoming Enseñado: The Social Production of Fishing Space
This research shows that a higher fishing effort correlates with a higher CPUE,
consistent with the predictions of optimal foraging theories and patch time allocation
models (Sosis 2002; Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi 2011; Aswani 1998; Thomas
2007). However, further analysis of individual differentiation over the same space reveals
that the same set of individuals habitually harvest less productive areas as spaces they
have claimed as “their own.” These findings signal that not all fishers are driven by
optimizing tendencies, as also suggested by other researchers (Guest 2003; van
Oostenbrugge et al. 2004; Teh et al. 2012). In contrast, preferences for less productive
spots have been shaped by habitual use and the development of intimate knowledge about
certain areas. In other words, habit, traditions, kinship and friendship networks, the
organization of labor, access, and ecological reasons other than actual CPUE influence
decisions about where to fish in the Ecuadorian cockle fishery. The notion of being
“ensenado” or “used to” certain areas explains not only why less productive cockle beds
are harvested, but also why those areas are harvested by the same individuals every time.
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People become habituated to certain areas for several reasons. The most common
explanation is that one becomes enseñado after harvesting the same grounds for many
years. As many cockle collectors in all four study areas explained, “it’s where I (or we)
have always gone” or “that’s where everyone goes.” Sometimes a fisher may claim to
have discovered those areas on his own, but more often, fishers explain they have long
harvested those areas in the footsteps of their forefathers, parents, grandparents, other
relatives, or a friends with whom they most prefer to fish. In Isla Costa Rica, the
mangrove areas in Zone 3 are described as “more extensive” and a “better habitat” (for
cockles), even though the shells may be smaller in size. By comparison, other extensive
mangrove areas in Zone 2 are dominated by mangrove crabs (Ucides occidentales),
which few fishers in Isla Costa Rica harvest for market. Thus, cockle beds in Zone 3 are
perceived as more abundant and productive, “constant and secure,” and “far enough from
the port that there is less competition” with outsiders. Similar to Basurto’s (2008)
observations, these perceptions guide individuals in their daily decisions and interactions
with fishery resources. Furthermore, since Zone 3 is officially part of the association’s
custodia, many people from Hualtaco respect the boundaries. People from Isla Costa Rica
say that their forefathers have always harvested Zone 3, which allowed them to
incorporate these areas into their legal custodia during their negotiations with the
government in 2000.
Another way one becomes enseñado is through regular use as they follow their
friends and family or join the passenger boat in a daily routine. Boat captains in Isla
Costa Rica carry groups of 10-15 cockle collectors to Zone 3, which is another reason
why the fishing effort is significantly higher than sites closer to the community. The cost
of the trip is $1-2 and a few people prefer not to pay and instead travel on foot to sites
nearer the community. Some collectors prefer to work alone “without the distraction of
conversation” thereby avoiding the larger groups who travel together to their respective
gathering grounds. When I asked people who predominantly harvest shells from Zone 2,
they commented that “only a few of us know those areas” and “I know those areas,”
which allows them to harvest successfully. It is not clear whether people become
enseñado to certain areas because of their actual success or whether the perception of
success grows out of the process of becoming enseñado. What is clear is that very few
cockle collectors in all four study areas say that they have no preference at all.
Knowledge, Timing, Rotation, and Fishery Sustainability
The implication of becoming enseñado is that fishers gain intimate knowledge
about their areas: the locations of the best spots, when they were harvested last, who else
is harvesting them and how often, and whether the others harvest in a sustainable manner.
Since the direction of the relationship between knowledge and perceptions of success is
not clear, resource space preferences may be partially explained by Bourdieu’s notion of
habitus, or the everyday practice of individuals by which knowledge is encoded in both
cognitive and behavioral interactions with social and biophysical structures of the
external world (Bourdieu 1977: 78-87). In other words, the dynamic production and
reproduction of local ecological knowledge is reinforced through reciprocal feedback
between knowledge and action in everyday practice.
Rotation of cockle beds is key to fishery productivity and stability. Many
collectors alternate among a set of preferred spots to which they are enseñado. According
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to customary knowledge, two weeks is sufficient time for a cockle bed to regenerate a
supply of shells for the next harvest, illustrating also the importance of the lunar cycle as
a guide for timing the rotation, as observed by other ethnographers in Brazil (Cordell
1974). With each harvest, small shells are often left behind to promote propagation and
spawning. Over generations, this local knowledge is passed down from one generation to
the next and often reinforced in workshops sponsored by biologists from NGOs and
government organizations. The fishery-managed areas of the custodia represent an
institutionalized effort to regulate rotation among cockle beds to ensure sustainability.
During the ten-day open period, the other cockle beds are given time to recuperate.
Because of their perceived productivity, many fishers abandon their other livelihood
activities to harvest almost exclusively from the managed areas, resulting in a higher
effort allocation than all the other zones. On the other hand, the managed areas are able to
withstand a higher fishing effort than open-access areas (Beitl 2011).
Local ecological knowledge about cockles may contribute to fisher success
(García-Quijano 2009) and temporal stability of the fishery (Begossi 2006), but whether
such practices represent intentional or incidental conservation is beyond the scope of this
study (see Pollnac and Johnson 2005; Ruttan 1998). On the other hand, many cockle
collectors do seem to have some sort of conservation ethic. For example, experienced
cockle collectors say that it is not necessary to plow through the mud “with two hands” or
use a machete to scrape or cut the mangrove roots in order to find shells. A good cockle
collector will leave the mud relatively undisturbed, neatly inserting his/her hands through
the small holes that suggest there is life below the mud. While many informants have
suggested this knowledge does not take a long time to develop, others expressed concern
that encroaching outsiders are responsible for destructive harvesting practices,
particularly in small communities like Isla Costa Rica and Las Manchas. Such suspicions
about outsiders have also been noted in the communities around San Lorenzo on the
Colombian border (Ocampo-Thomason 2006).
Just as a cockle fisher becomes enseñado to certain areas and fishing companions,
he/ she also becomes habituated to ecological conditions that differentiate cockle beds.
For example, the consistency of the mud or the density of the mangrove branches and
roots affect the relative ease and ability for some collectors to gather shells successfully.
Some people prefer the harder soils despite the dangers of cutting and scraping their
hands on mangrove roots and decaying branches buried in the mud. Others prefer softer
soils characteristic of younger mangrove colonies and abandoned shrimp farms, despite
the danger of sinking up to one’s waist and losing a boot. One cockle fisher from Isla
Costa Rica prefers to work in the préstamos, which refer to shrimp ponds walls. He
believes that the effluents from the shrimp ponds nourish the filter-feeding cockles
allowing his shells to grow quite large, even if his catch contains fewer shells than what
others gather from Zone 3. He explains that he is “enseñado to harvesting larger shells.”
Working predominantly in Zone 2 has enabled him to establish affable relations with the
shrimp farmers who grant him special permission to harvest cockles from the mangrove
stands that enclose the ponds.
Finally, certain buyers of mangrove cockles also become enseñado to purchasing
catches of a particular quality. Even though shells sell by the number and not by the size
or weight, some buyers prefer to purchase catches considered “good quality,” referring to
the average size of shells and proportion of A. tuberculosa in the catch. Moreover, the
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negotiation largely depends on the relationship between cockle collectors and their
buyers. Some cockle fishers sell their catch to the same buyer every time (usually a friend
or relative). Others reported in the interviews that they negotiate with multiple buyers
before making their sale, although my observations suggest that this practice is less
common. In sum, larger catches do not always signify more profitable economic returns
for all fishers (Van Holt 2012). Furthermore, economics is not the main driver of resource
space preferences or fishing behavior.
Adaptive Challenges and Resilience in Mangrove-Associated Fisheries
Like many small-scale fisheries, several challenges confront the sustainability of
Ecuador’s mangrove-associated fisheries. Many cockle collectors have expressed
concerns about increasing competition, encroachment by outsiders (highlanders,
foreigners, or other communities), enclosure by shrimp farming or custodias, and
pollution (urban contamination or shrimp farm discharge). Some fishers claim they have
been displaced by these processes. As each fisher has a set of his/her own preferred
gathering grounds, he/she is able to calculate a timely resting period to ensure the
sustainable exploitation of particular spots. However, many fishers are worried that no
one leaves the sites to rest as long as they should anymore. Furthermore, the timely
rotation among gathering grounds is more challenging to coordinate in large communities
like Muisne and Hualtaco where competition in a free-for-all is higher. Climate change
may pose further challenges to fishery stability as the wet, rainy seasons associated with
cockle spawning grow shorter.
Shrimp farms have displaced many fishers from their preferred spots since the
1980s and continue to contribute to other annoyances that make cockle collecting more
difficult and dangerous. In addition to occasional confrontations between shrimp farmers
and fishers, many people in Muisne complain about “pica pica,” a skin irritation
associated with a particular kind of algae found around shrimp ponds. Other fishers in
Muisne believe that the venomous fish they call “peje sapo” is more abundant in the mud
around shrimp farms. Environmentally, shrimp farms have disrupted the hydrology of the
estuaries, making some areas impassable by motorboat and changing the consistency of
the mud in gathering grounds. Shrimp aquaculture is also associated with occasional fish
kills and other pollutants that may affect biological processes of settlement and growth of
cockle larvae.
In the future, many cockle collectors may leave the fishery to pursue other
livelihood strategies. Livelihood switching and “occupational pluralism” is common in
many fisheries around the world, despite the immense sense of pride and job satisfaction
that many fishers have (McCay 1978; Griffith and Valdés Pizzini 2002; McGoodwin
1990). A reduced fishing effort has many implications for fishery sustainability. For
example, other research has shown a positive relationship between migration and catch
rates (Hamilton et al. 2004).
On the other hand, an unwillingness or inability to leave the fishery (Teh et al.
2012) or a strong sense of pride or identity as a fisher might restrict people’s ability to be
resilient and adaptive in the face of broader social and environmental change (Coulthard
2008). This does not necessarily suggest fishery stability is threatened. Ecuador’s recent
policy changes in favor of mangrove conservation, its history of activism, and
international attention to social justice by organizations like Greenpeace may all
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contribute to increased mangrove restoration in the years to come. Newly constructed
ancestral identities and a new “sense of peoplehood” offer a promise of empowerment for
mangrove users whose life has been previously undervalued (Latorre 2012, 2014). These
processes may have deepened the sense of pride among many cockle fishers as “ancestral
users of mangroves.” Because of this, many cockle collectors hope to protect mangroves
and fishery-based livelihoods so they may pass the traditions down to their children. A
longitudinal research design is needed to assess how such livelihood decisions affect
fishery resilience and how environmental changes, in turn, affect the spatial allocation of
fishing effort. Such future research would contribute considerably to understanding about
fisheries as complex adaptive systems (Mahon et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 2013a; Wilson et
al. 2013b; Daw et al. 2012).
Conclusions
The purpose of this paper was to explain patterns in fishing effort allocation as a
response to cultural and environmental factors that influence resource space preferences.
This research addresses a methodological gap in the literature on folk management
identified by Pollnac and Johnson (2005) and contributes to understanding about the
social production of fishing space. While small-scale fisheries are highly dynamic and
often characterized by livelihood switching, the targeting of multiple species, and
uncertainty about fisher decisions, the focus here on Ecuador’s cockle fishery has
controlled for some of the complexity, allowing for a more nuanced, in-depth analysis of
the cultural factors influencing fishing effort allocation in the context of environmental
change. This study builds on existing research on benthic fisheries (Basurto et al. 2013)
and further contributes to qualitative understanding of fisheries as complex adaptive
systems in which self-organization emerges out of individual decisions, adaptations, and
learning (Wilson et al. 2013a; Wilson et al.2013b; Berkes et al. 2000).
The use of GIS as a data management and analytical tool has many potential
management applications (Aswani and Lauer 2006; St. Martin 2004). First, mapping
customary use of fishing grounds could aid Ecuadorian communities that continue to
witness the illegal encroachment of shrimp farms. Second, the approach used here may
provide methodological guidelines for addressing issues raised by McClain and others
(2013) concerning representation since the local community coordinated the data
collection over a period of several months from a representative sample. This research
should further be of interest to Ecuadorian regulatory agencies and research institutes like
the INP as they face institutional constraints and other challenges to understanding the
complexity of artisanal fisheries, which support thousands of livelihoods in coastal
Ecuador. Furthermore, the data gathered through this partnership with Asociación Isla
Costa Rica represents a successful case of collaborative learning between researchers and
resource users (St. Martin et al. 2007) and may serve as a model for research institutions
with limited resources. It is hoped that the lessons learned from this research may be
applicable to other small-scale fisheries throughout the developing world with limited
institutional capacity for research.
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